

## Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

IO-10 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01

SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 NSC-05 MC-02

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P R 271755Z OCT 75

FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4270

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 5845

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: OPTION 888: EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS: NEW UK APPROACH

SUMMARY: AT OCTOBER 27 SPC MEETING, UK REP (LOGAN) MADE A STATEMENT, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS A CONSIDERED UK VIEW, ARGUING THAT GUIDANCE ON OPTION III TO AHG SHOULD ENABLE THE AHG TO PRESENT THE ENTIRE ALLIED POSITION ON EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS TO THE OTHER SIDE EARLY IN THE DISCUSSION. END SUMMARY.

1. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE UK LETTER TRANSMITTING THE UK REP'S TALKING POINTS TO SPC MEMBERS AFTER THE MEETING:

BEGIN TEXT OF LETTER:

HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ARE CONCERNED THAT THE LIMITS OF THE OFFER CURRENTLY REFERRED TO AS OPTION III SHALL BE CLEARLY  
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ESTABLISHED IN THE ALLIANCE, PARTICULARLY AS REGARDS CONSTRAINTS ON EQUIPMENT, AND THAT THE NEGOTIATORS IN VIENNA SHALL HAVE DISCRETION TO INDICATE THESE LIMITS TO THE OTHER SIDE AND BE READY TO DEFEND THEM RESOLUTELY. THEY FEAR THAT THE GUIDANCE NOW

BEING DRAFTED IN THE SPC IS NOT GIVING THE NEGOTIATORS SUFFICIENT DISCRETION ON THIS MATTER AND THAT IT THEREFORE RISTKS PUTTING THEM IN A POSITION OF HAVING TO SHOW RELUCTANCE TO RESPOND TO LIKELY QUESTIONS FROM THE OTHER SIDE, WHO MAY CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT THE ALLIED POSITION IS NOT FIRM AND THAT FURTHER PRESSURE WILL YIELD CONCESSIONS.  
END TEXT OF LETTER.

2. THE FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE UK REP'SPEAKING NOTES:

BEGIN TEXT OF SPEAKING NOTES:

FROM THE BEGINNING OPTION III HAS BEEN REGARDED AS A ONCE-FOR ALL OFFER. NOT TO BE REPEATED. NOT TO BE EXTENDED.

INITIALLY UK BELIEVED ALL ASPECTS OF CONSTRAINTS ON EQUIPMENTS NEEDED TO BE EXAMINED IN THE ALLIANCE SO THAT EVERYONE WAS CLEAR HOW FAR THE OFFER WENT AND THAT THERE WERE FIRM AND DEFENSIBLE POSITIONS TO OCCUPY AGAINST WARSAW PACT PRESSURE TO ENLARGE IT. OTHERWISE SLIPPERY SLOPES.

FIRM DEFENSIBLE POSITION HAS BEEN WORKED OUT FOR NON-US AND NON-SOVIET EQUIPMENT. WILL BE INDICATED TO WARSAW PACT. PRESSURE IN THIS DIRECTION CAN BE HELD.

ENQUIRY AND PRESSURE TO BE EXPECTED IN OTHER DIRECTIONS -  
CONSTRAINTS ON US NUCLEARS  
US TANKS  
SOVIET NUCLEARS  
SOVIET TANKS

UNLESS ALLIED NEGOTIATORS CAN EARLY SHOW LIMITS OF ALLIED OFFER IN THESE DIRECTIONS AND DETERMINATION TO DEFEND THEM WARSAW PACT WILL BE ENCOURAGED TO MAINTAIN PRESSURE FOR FURTHER CONCESSIONS.

TACTICAL REASOSN ALSO FOR MAKING ALLIED OFFER CLEAR AT AN EARLY  
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STAGE. IMPRACTICABLE TO EXPECT TO GIVE INITIALLY ONLY GENERAL OUTLINE OF REDUCTIONS PROPOSED AND FOR INITIAL PHASE TO BE FOLLOWED BY DISCUSSION OF MORE DETAIL ONLY IF INSTRUCTED RESPONSE IS RECEIVED AND IT SHOWS INTEREST IN THE OFFER. WARSAW PACT PROBABLY ALREADY KNOW OPTION III REDUCTION PROPOSALS. TO GO NO FURTHER THAN THEY KNOW ALREADY IS MORE LIKELY TO EVOKE A RESPONSE WHICH IS NEGATIVE OR DESTRUCTIVE. IN ASSESSING VALUE TO THEM OF OPTION III SOVIETS WILL ATTACH AS MUCH IMPORTANCE TO THE NATURE OF THE CONSTRAINTS WHICH THE ALLIES PROPOSE TO ACCEPT FOR THEMSELVES AND IMPOSE ON THE WARSAW PACT AS TO THE TYPES AND NUMBERS OF THE US SYSTEMS TO BE WITHDRAWN.

IF SITUATION WERE REVERSED WE WOULD EXPECT OUR NEGOTIATORS TO

PROBE IN THESE DIRECTIONS BEFORE ASKING US FOR A CONSIDERED RESPONSE. THE RUSSIANS ARE LIKELY TO EXPECT THAT THE ALLIES HAVE IT IN MIND TO SEEK RECIPROCAL RESTRAINTS ON THEM AND IN PARTICULAR ON THE SOVIET AIRCRAFT REPLACEMENT PROGRAMME. THEY MAY EXPECT ALSO THAT LIMITATIONS ON SSMS WILL APPLY EQUALLY TO RANGES UNDER 500 KILOMETRES - IT IS IN OUR INTERESTS TO ESTABLISH THIS LIMITATION EARLY SO THAT LANCE IS NOT AFFECTED. ALSO IN OUR INTEREST TO INDICATE THAT CONSTRAINT ON SOVIET TANKS WILL NOT BE EXTENDED TO ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT - FROGS AND SCUDS. THIS HELPS TO MAKE OPTION III MORE ATTRACTIVE. WITHIN A WEEK OF TABLING OPTION III THERE MAY BE MANY QUESTIONS ON THESE POINTS FROM WARSAW PACT, BUT NO INSTRUCTED RESPONSE. REFERENCE AT THAT POINT TO COUNCIL COULD CREATE HIATUS IN NEGOTIATIONS, LEAVING ALLIES TOO LITTLE TIME BEFORE END OF CURRENT ROUND AND GIVING WARSAW PACT CHANCE TO MISREPRESENT OPTION III IN THEIR PROPAGANDA.

GUIDANCE PAPER SHOULD GIVE ALLIED NEGOTIATORS ESSENTIAL INSTRUCTION ON TACTICAL OBJECTIVE, I.E.M, TO ELICIT AS CONSTRUCTIVE A RESPONSE AS POSSIBLE TO NEW OFFER AS A WHOLE. THIS WILL ENTAIL GIVING WARSAW PACT AS MUCH INFORMATION AS OUR NEGOTIATORS JUDGE NECESSARY FOR THAT PURPOSE WHILST AT THE SAME TIME KEEPING THE FOCUS ON THE GENERAL FEATURES OF THE OFFER AND NOT LETTING WARSAW PACT AVOID A RESPONSE BY SIDE-TRACKING THE DISCUSSION INTO TOO MUCH DETAIL. MORE FLEXIBLE APPROACH TO THE RELEVANT PASSAGES OF THE GUIDANCE PAPER WILL NOT ONLY SUIT NEGOTIATIONS BETTER, BUT PERMIT EARLIER AGREEMENT ON IT.

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07

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P R 271755Z OCT 75

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 4271

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

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USDEL MBFR VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 USNATO 5845

END TEXT.

E. UK REP CONCLUDED, ALTHOUGH THIS DOES NOT APPEAR IN THE TEXT OF THE SPEAKING NOTES, THAT UK ATTACHES CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE TO THIS POSITION. IF THE SPC WERE NOT ABLE TO REACH COMMON GROUND ON IT, THEN IT WOULD BE NECESSARY TO TAKE THE MATTER TO THE NAC, BUT A REGULAR NAC, NOT A REINFORCED ONE AS THE BELGIAN HAD SUGGESTED. HE SAID THAT THE UK WAS NOT PROPOSING LANGUAGE AT THIS TIME.

4. US REP (MOORE) SAID THAT HE KNEW THAT HIS AUTHORITIES WOULD STUDY THIS UK STATEMENT CAREFULLY. HOWEVER, HE WISHED TO POINT OUT THAT THE US IS CONVINCED THAT EARLY DISCUSSION OF CEILINGS ISSUES WOULD SIDETRACK THE NEGOTIATION FROM THE MAIN OPTION III PROPOSAL. THE US DOES WISH TO SEEK TO POSTPONE DISCUSSION OF THESE ISSUES, IN ORDER TO TEST EASTERN INTEREST IN THE ALLIED PROPOSAL AT FULL STRENGTH, AND DOES NOT BELIEVE THAT SEEKING TO DEFER THE CEILINGS DISCUSSION COMPROMISES ANY ALLIED POSITION ON ANY CEILINGS ISSUE.

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5. COMMENT: OTHER SPC MEMBERS WISH THE AHG TO SEEK TO DEFER DISCUSSION OF CEILINGS ISSUES. THIS IS TRUE EVEN OF THOSE COUNTRIES WHICH WISH AHG, IF PRESSED, TO GIVE NEGATIVE RESPONSE TO EASTERN QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ALLIES WILL ACCEPT LIMITS ON NON-US EQUIPMENT. RE LIMITS ON US AND SOVIET EQUIPMENT, SOME ALLIES HAVE WANTED TO DEFER ALLIED USE OF THE POSITION IN PARA 6 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE UNTIL THE EAST HAS SHOWN SERIOUS INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT INCORPORATING THE ENTIRE ALLIED PROPOSAL. HENCE, THE COMPROMISE LANGUAGE IN PARA 6 THAT THE EASTERN RESPONSE MUST SHOW SERIOUS INTEREST IN AN AGREEMENT INCORPORATING "THE BASIC ELEMENTS AS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 1". THUS, THE NEW UK APPROACH ON CEILINGS ISSUES DOES NOT START OUT FROM A POSITION OF STRENGTH.

6. THIS NEW UK APPROACH, IF THE UK STRONGLY MAINTAINS IT, WILL FURTHER COMPLICATE SPC WORK ON PARA 5 OF THE DRAFT GUIDANCE, RE ALLIED RESPONSE TO EARLY EASTERN QUESTIONS ON NON-US EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS. WE CONSIDER IT IMPORTANT THAT US MAKE AN INSTRUCTED RESPONSE TO THE UK STATEMENT AT THE THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30, SPC MEETING. END COMMENT.

7. ACTION REQUESTED: GUIDANCE IN TIME FOR SPC MEETING THURSDAY, OCTOBER 30.

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<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

## Message Attributes

**Automatic Decaptioning:** X  
**Capture Date:** 18 AUG 1999  
**Channel Indicators:** n/a  
**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
**Concepts:** n/a  
**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 27 OCT 1975  
**Decaption Date:** 01 JAN 1960  
**Decaption Note:**  
**Disposition Action:** RELEASED  
**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Authority:** greeneet  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 28 MAY 2004  
**Disposition Event:**  
**Disposition History:** n/a  
**Disposition Reason:**  
**Disposition Remarks:**  
**Document Number:** 1975NATO05845  
**Document Source:** ADS  
**Document Unique ID:** 00  
**Drafter:** n/a  
**Enclosure:** n/a  
**Executive Order:** 11652 GDS  
**Errors:** n/a  
**Film Number:** n/a  
**From:** NATO  
**Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Image Path:**  
**ISecure:** 1  
**Legacy Key:** link1975/newtext/t197510101/abbrzmur.tel  
**Line Count:** 212  
**Locator:** TEXT ON-LINE  
**Office:** n/a  
**Original Classification:** SECRET  
**Original Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Original Previous Classification:** n/a  
**Original Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Page Count:** 4  
**Previous Channel Indicators:**  
**Previous Classification:** SECRET  
**Previous Handling Restrictions:** n/a  
**Reference:** n/a  
**Review Action:** RELEASED, APPROVED  
**Review Authority:** greeneet  
**Review Comment:** n/a  
**Review Content Flags:**  
**Review Date:** 16 APR 2003  
**Review Event:**  
**Review Exemptions:** n/a  
**Review History:** RELEASED <16 APR 2003 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <17 SEP 2003 by greeneet>  
**Review Markings:**

Margaret P. Grafeld  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
06 JUL 2006

**Review Media Identifier:**  
**Review Referrals:** n/a  
**Review Release Date:** n/a  
**Review Release Event:** n/a  
**Review Transfer Date:**  
**Review Withdrawn Fields:** n/a  
**Secure:** OPEN  
**Status:** NATIVE  
**Subject:** MBFR: OPTION 888: EQUIPMENT LIMITATIONS: NEW UK APPROACH  
**TAGS:** PARM, NATO, MBFR  
**To:** STATE  
SECDEF INFO BONN  
LONDON  
MBFR VIENNA  
USNMR SHAPE  
USCINCEUR

**Type:** TE

**Markings:** Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006